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Abstract  
 
The allocation problem in health care can be characterised as a mathematical programming problem 
but attempts to incorporate uncertainty in costs and effect have suffered from important limitations.  A 
two stage stochastic mathematical programming formulation is developed and applied to a numerical 
example to explore and demonstrate the implications of this more general and comprehensive 
approach. The solution to the allocation problem for different budgets, budgetary policies, and 
available actions are then demonstrated.  This analysis is used to evaluate different budgetary 
policies and examine the adequacy of standard decision rules in cost-effectiveness analysis.  The 
research decision is then considered alongside the allocation problem.  This more general formulation 
demonstrates that the value of further research depends on: i) the budgetary policy in place; ii) the 
realisations revealed during the budget period; iii) remedial actions that may be available; and iv) 
variability in parameters values. 
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Introduction 
 
Standard decision rules in cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) claim to determine the efficient allocation 
of health care resources in two contexts.  Firstly, in the absence of an exogenous budget constraint a 
higher authority can set a societal willingness to pay for additional health benefits and implement all 
independent treatments with positive net benefit.  In these circumstances the budget for health care is 
not fixed but implicitly determined by this social value of health. Alternatively, where a higher authority 
sets a fixed budget for health care the decision maker must select from all available treatments the 
subset that maximises health benefits subject to the budget constraint.  In these circumstances the 
cost-effectiveness threshold represents an estimate of the cost-effectiveness of the marginal 
programme which will be displaced or the reciprocal of the shadow price of the budget constraint 
(Culyer et al., 2007, Johannesson and Weinstein, 1993). If the estimate of the threshold is not 
consistent with the budget for health care or the productivity of current activities then resources will 
not be allocated optimally as the threshold will not identify the true opportunity costs (Birch and Gafni, 
1992, Birch and Gafni, 1993, Gafni and Birch, 2006).  
  
Mathematical programming (MP) offers a solution to this allocation problem, but requires full 
information on the costs and health benefits of all competing treatment options within all health care 
programmes (Earnshaw and Dennett, 2003).  Stinnett and Paltiel (1996) provided a general MP 
framework to accommodate information regarding returns to scale, indivisibilities, programme 
interdependence, and ethical constraints.  Other authors have examined the implications of 
indivisibility (Earnshaw and Dennett, 2003, Sendi and Al, 2003), returns to scale (Elbasha and 
Messonnier, 2004), ethical constraints and multiple budgets over time (Epstein et al., 2007).  Many 
have demonstrated that the standard decision rules in CEA may be optimal when there is a single 
budget constraint and perfect divisibility, or at least any indivisibilities are small relative to the budget 
(Epstein et al., 2007, Laska et al., 1999, Stinnett and Paltiel, 1996).  MP techniques have been 
applied to some policy problems (Brandeau et al., 2003, Earnshaw et al., 2002, Zaric and Brandeau, 
2001).  
 
All the work cited above assumes that costs and effects are known.  In general, however, the value of 
costs and effects are variable and estimates of their expected values are uncertain.  The need to 
characterise uncertainty and its consequences in CEA is well documented (Claxton, 2008) and 
generally implemented using probabilistic methods (Claxton et al., 2005) with the results summarised 
using cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (Fenwick et al., 2001) and value of information analysis 
(Claxton, 1999).   In the absence of irreversibility or significant sunk costs (Eckermann and Willan, 
2006) the same standard decision rules, based on expected cost and expected health benefit, are 
argued to apply (Claxton, 1999).  It is the decision to acquire additional information which is primarily 
determined by uncertainty in costs and effects and variability appears irrelevant in most common 
circumstances.  
 
It is possible to characterise the full allocation problem under uncertainty explicitly by reformulating 
the MP as a stochastic analysis. To date there are few proposed stochastic mathematical 
programming (SMP) formulations in the literature (Al et al., 2005, Sendi and Al, 2003, Sendi et al., 
2003).  These all suffer from important limitations including the use of arbitrary exogenous 
parameters, the inability to examine alternative budgetary policies, and the failure to inform both the 
allocation and research decision problem simultaneously.  A more general and unified approach is 
required.  A SMP formulation which overcomes many of these problems has recently been proposed 
(Chalabi et al., 2008).  This paper develops and applies this formulation to a stylised numerical 
example to explore and demonstrate the implications of a more general and comprehensive approach 
to allocation and research decisions.  
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Firstly, the rationale for the proposed SMP formulation is 
presented.  In doing so, previous approaches are critiqued and their limitations discussed.  The 
allocation problem and the associated numerical example are introduced as well as the formulation 
that enables the limitations of previous methods to be overcome.  The solution to the allocation 
problem for different budgets, budgetary policies, and their available actions are then demonstrated.  
This analysis is used to evaluate different budgetary policies and examine the adequacy of standard 
decision rules in CEA.  The research decision is then considered alongside the allocation problem. A 
more general formulation which can inform research and allocation decisions simultaneously and 
consistently is presented. The final section concludes with a discussion.  
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Methodological Background 
 
A risk neutral decision maker would aim to allocate resources to maximise expected health benefits 
subject to expected costs meeting the budget constraint.  However, since costs and benefits are 
random variables arising from uncertainty and variability, nearly any ex-ante decision about the 
allocation of resources will lead to some probability that the budget is exceeded.  If, ex-post, the 
budget is exceeded there will be a loss of benefits as some programmes and treatments are curtailed, 
or additional funding is diverted from other sectors of the economy.  To allocate resources optimally, 
ex-ante decision makers must consider all the potential realisations of costs and health benefits and 
identify which programmes will be adjusted in order to minimise the expected loss of benefits.  
Although it is irrelevant to the allocation decision whether the randomness in costs and health benefits 
arises from uncertainty or variability, the distinction between these causes of randomness is critical to 
the question of whether more information would be valuable to inform the allocation decision (Chalabi 
et al., 2008). This is because the acquisition of additional information will reduce the randomness in 
the health benefits and costs due to uncertainty but will not affect that associated with variability (Frey 
and Burmaster, 1999).   
 
Stochastic mathematical programming methods have been proposed to allocate resources between 
health care programmes when costs and effects are uncertain (Al et al., 2005, Sendi and Al, 2003). 
These methods are largely based on chance constrained formulations where a probability of meeting 
the budget is specified so that the conditions of the decision rule are satisfied.  Other candidate 
formulations are those of robust optimization (Leung et al., 2007, Mulvey et al., 1995).  Al et al (2005) 
and Sendi and Al (2003) propose maximising health benefits subject to a probability,D , of meeting 
the budget constraint ( 1dD ): 
 
  
Max.  ( ( , ))
   s.t.  ( , )   
ZE B Z X
P C Z X Dd < t                                              (1) 
where X  is the set of decision variables (treatment allocation decisions),< represents the budget, 
(.)ZE  denotes the expectation with respect to the random parameters Z , and (.)P  denotes the 
probability of meeting the budget constraint.  ( , )B Z X and ( , )C Z X  represent the benefits and 
costs, respectively.  The inequality on the budget constraint ensures that the budget is met with a 
probability of at leastD .   
 
This formulation suffers from a number of disadvantages.  Firstly, the decision maker must specify an 
arbitrary parameterD .  It is not clear how the value ofD should be set, or how any particular value 
could be used to represent actual budgetary rules which may be imposed on a health care system.  
For example, a budgetary policy that the health care decision maker cannot run a deficit impliesD is 
set at 1.  This hard budget constraint can impose substantial opportunity costs, ultimately leading to 
corner solutions, i.e. no health care is provided due to the risk of exceeding the constraint, or 
restrictive provision of health care and large expected budget surpluses.  If D is arbitrarily set at less 
than 1 to avoid such outcomes, then the budget can be exceeded but the opportunity costs are not 
explicitly valued within the formulation.  A penalty function was included in the original formulation but 
this was based on an exogenous and ex-ante assessment of the opportunity costs of the additional 
resources required (Al et al., 2005). Therefore, although the approach avoids the use of some 
exogenous and ex-ante assessment of a cost-effectiveness threshold, the formulation depends on an 
arbitrary parameter and an exogenous, ex-ante penalty function.  It is unable to characterise or 
evaluate real budgetary policies and, since it does not distinguish between uncertainty and variability, 
is unable to consider the value of information for the research decision.   
 
A key requirement of any proposed solution to the allocation problem is to allow the evaluation of a 
range of actual budgetary rules in which consistent (endogenous) assessment of the opportunity 
costs of ex-post violation of the constraints is taken into account.  In addition, the value of acquiring 
new evidence to inform the allocation problem in light of its current uncertainty needs to be 
considered simultaneously and consistently.   
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To overcome the limitations of previous approaches, recently a more general formulation which 
addresses these key requirements has been proposed (Chalabi et al., 2008).  This formulation avoids 
the use of arbitrary, exogenous parameters and allows the characterisation of actual budgetary 
policies, including a strict budgetary rule where deficits are not possible and the constraints must 
always be met.  The opportunity costs (the health forgone due to curtailing some programmes and 
treatments) of violating the budget constraint are incorporated directly.  Since uncertainty and 
variability are distinguished, the value of acquiring information to inform the whole allocation problem 
can also be considered. This formulation demonstrates that the allocation and research decision 
problem depends on a number of considerations: i) the size of the overall budget; ii) budgetary policy 
in place; iii) the information that is revealed and its timing; iv) the subsequent actions available to 
decision makers; as well as the costs and effects associated with the treatments, populations and 
programmes which constitute the allocation problem. 
 
 
The Allocation Problem 
 
Without loss of generality an allocation problem, which consists of three mutually exclusive treatment 
options ( 1,..,3)j   in each of three separate population groups ( 1,..,3)i  within three independent 
health care programmes ( 1,..,3)k   is considered.  For simplicity, binary health outcomes ( , )a b  are 
assumed for each treatment across the health care programmes, and one of the treatments in each of 
the programmes has zero-cost (i.e., a no treatment option, 1j  ).  The treatment decision for 
population i  in health care programme k  can be described by a simple decision tree (Chalabi et al., 
2008) with health outcomes 
, ,
( , )ijk a ijk bu u , the costs associated with the treatment pathways 
, ,
( , )ijk a ijk bc c and the probabilities of the binary outcomes , ,( , )ijk a ijk bp p .  For each of the health care 
programmes and populations, treatment 3j   is more effective and more costly than treatment 2j   
which in turn is more effective and more costly than no treatment 1j  .  For simplicity and to examine 
the performance of standard decision rules in their most favourable circumstances, costs and benefits 
are assumed to occur within the single budgetary period.  In addition we assume constant returns to 
scale, divisibility of treatments within populations and a single budget constraint.  
 
Uncertainty in the allocation problem is characterised in terms of the probability parameters, whereas 
variability is captured in terms of the number of patients in the health outcome and cost states 
conditional on the probabilities (Chalabi et al., 2008).  The set of decision variables is defined 
by   for , , 1,..,3ijkX x i j k   where ijkx  denotes the proportion of population group i in health care 
programme k that is allocated to treatment j .   
 
The total expected health benefits and the total expected costs with respect to the uncertain and 
variable parameters Z are given by 
   3 3 3 , , , ,
1 1 1
( , ) ( (1 ) )Z ik ijk ijk a ijk a ijk a ijk b
k i j
E B Z X n x p u p u
   
 u u u   u¦¦¦                             (2) 
and 
   3 3 3 , , , ,
1 1 1
( , ) ( (1 ) )Z ik ijk ijk a ijk a ijk a ijk b
k i j
E C Z X n x p c p c
   
 u u u   u¦¦¦                              (3) 
respectively, where ikn is the total number of patients in population group i and health care 
programme k (Chalabi et al., 2008). 
 
The objective of the SMP is to determine the optimal mix of treatments ijkx that will maximise the 
health benefits (2) subject to the costs (3) meeting the overall budget constraint and any additional 
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constraints imposed on the system.  To demonstrate the implications of the SMP formulation of this 
allocation problem it is applied to a numerical example given in Appendix 1.
1
  
 
The Allocation Decision 
 
The decision maker wishes to allocate resources optimally among the various competing health care 
interventions, populations and programmes.  A higher authority sets the overall budget available and 
imposes rules on how the budget can be spent.  A hard budget constraint may be enforced by the 
authority, where the health care decision maker cannot exceed the budget under any circumstances.  
This type of policy will impose substantial opportunity costs (a corner solution where no health care is 
provided is possible) unless the decision maker can take remedial action to avoid a deficit as 
information about actual costs and effects is revealed during the budgetary period.   
 
Alternatively, a less restrictive policy (soft budget constraint) may be implemented, i.e., as long as the 
health care decision maker plans to meet the budget at expectation, any deficit will be indemnified 
(deficits are likely as costs will be variable and their expectation uncertain).  The standard decision 
rules in CEA are effectively based on this type of budgetary policy since decisions based on expected 
net benefits mean that surpluses or deficits are valued at the cost-effectiveness threshold.  However, 
this type of budgetary policy is uncommon in budget constrained health care systems and for good 
reason.  There will be substantial asymmetry of information between the higher authority (principal) 
and the health care decision maker (the agent).  It will be impossible, or at least very costly for the 
principal, to effectively monitor the agent and establish that their ex-ante plans do meet the budget at 
expectation.  In these circumstances the agent is likely to plan to exceed the budget knowing that the 
deficit will be indemnified and their extravagant plans will be undetected.  Below, we explore 
alternative budgetary policies (soft and hard constraints) and consider the impact of information and 
actions available to the health care decision maker.   
 
Soft budget constraint 
 
If a soft budget constraint is implemented the allocation problem can be formulated as follows: 
  
 
3
1
Max. ( , )
   s.t.  ( , )   
         1  for , 1,..,3
Z
Z
ijk
j
E B Z X
E C Z X
x i k
 
d <
  ¦
                                                                                            (4) 
 
where< is the overall budget,  ( , )ZE B Z X is the total expected health benefits, and 
 ( , )ZE C Z X is the total expected costs.  The constraint ¦
 
 
3
1
1
j
ijkx  ensures that every individual in 
each of the population groups and programmes is allocated to one of the three treatment options. 
 
                                                 
1
 The allocation problem described in Appendix 1 was solved using the linear program package lpSolve in R.(http://www.r-
project.org/) The R project for statistical computing.  This returned the optimal values of the decision variables, the shadow 
price of the constraints, and the expected health benefits reported in subsequent figures. 
6   CHE Research Paper 44 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Budget (£ million)
S
h
a
d
o
w
 p
ri
c
e
 o
f 
b
u
d
g
e
t 
c
o
n
st
ra
in
t
Threshold § £14,000
Threshold § £8,800
Threshold § £4,700
 
Figure 1:  The shadow price (health benefits per additional £1 million)  
 
The relationship between the shadow price of the budget constraint (the gain in health benefits as the 
budget grows per additional £1 million) and the overall budget is illustrated in Figure 1.  The shadow 
price falls with the budget in a series of steps. Along each flat portion the same set of optimal 
treatments are selected but with different proportions of the population receiving them (a mixed 
programme within a population).  At the points of discontinuity, the optimal allocation takes integer-
values and there are no mixed programmes.  At a budget of £35.8m all the most effective treatments 
in all populations and programmes are funded in full and further budget increases do not result in any 
additional health benefits.  Hence, the shadow price falls to zero at £35.8m.  The total expected health 
benefits from a soft budgetary policy are illustrated in Figure 2 and increase with budget.  Total 
expected health benefits reach a maximum of 7289 at a budget of £35.8m.  
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Figure 2: Expected total health benefits for budgetary policies and available actions 
 
The solution to (4) yields the same set of decision variables as solving for each of the independent 
health care programmes separately using the standard CE decision rules with the correct threshold.  
Since the threshold is the reciprocal of the shadow price it increases with the size of the budget, as 
shown in Figure 1.  Therefore, standard decisions rules in CEA can be optimal but only in very 
restricted circumstances: i) a single soft budget constraint; and ii) no asymmetry of information 
between principal and agent, or at least the principal can detect and punish inappropriate plans.  
These conditions are in addition to those assumptions more commonly discussed: i) perfect 
divisibility; ii) a threshold equal to the reciprocal of the shadow price of the budget constraint and iii) 
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no other binding constraints. However, for the reasons discussed above soft budgetary policies are 
uncommon and will tend to be either costly to effectively monitor or will be exploited by the agents.  
 
Hard budget constraint 
 
Alternatively a higher authority may implement a hard budgetary policy. To satisfy this requirement all 
possible random realisations of the uncertain and variable parameters must be anticipated so that 
decision variables can be chosen ex-ante which will satisfy the constraint under all random 
realisations.  The allocation problem under this hard budget constraint can be formulated as follows: 
 
 
1
2
3
3
1
Max. ( , )
   s.t.  ( , )  
         ( , )  
         ( , )  
          ....
         ( , )  
         1  for , 1,..,3
Z
N
ijk
j
E B Z X
C Z X
C Z X
C Z X
C Z X
x i k
 
d <
d <
d <
d <
  ¦
                                         (5) 
 
where 1,.., NZ Z  are N random realisations of the uncertain and variable parameters (theoretically 
infinite but set to a large number in the simulation), and ),( 1 XZC  are the costs associated with 
random realisation 1Z .  The decision maker maximises the expected health benefits subject to the 
costs from each random realisation meeting the budget constraint.  This type of budgetary policy will 
impose substantial opportunity costs since provision of health care is restricted to avoid the risk of 
violation of the constraint.  It is equivalent to Į=1 in the chance constrained formulations proposed by 
Al et al and Sendi and Al in formulation (1).   
 
The expected health benefits when a hard constraint is imposed are illustrated in Figure 2 for a range 
of budgets.  The expected health benefits are lower than with a soft budgetary policy, The difference 
represents the opportunity cost of imposing a hard constraint and is modest (e.g., 6.9% of health 
benefits at a budget of £25m) because the only random parameters are probabilities bounded by 0 
and 1.  In this example the expected health benefits reach the maximum of 7289 when the budget 
exceeds £46.1m rather than £35.8m, i.e., additional budget is required before decision makers can 
take the risk of implementing all the most effective treatments.  If other variable and uncertain 
parameters where introduced which are unbounded (i.e. described by distributions which are defined 
over an infinite range) then a corner solution is possible, i.e. no health care is provided due to the risk 
of exceeding the budget.  In these circumstances there will be no finite budget which will allow 
decision makers to take such risks. 
  
The analysis of the hard budgetary policy above represents an extreme characterisation of what 
information will be revealed during the budgetary period and what remedial actions might be available 
to the decision maker.  In this case, once the decision variables are chosen, then irrespective of what 
information might be revealed (e.g., actual expenditure), there are no actions the decision maker can 
take to avoid a deficit.   
 
Available actions 
 
Although decision variables must be chosen ex-ante, as in formulations (4) and (5), a more realistic 
characterisation of the allocation problem would allow realisations of health outcomes and costs to be 
revealed over time within the budget period.  Such information provides an indication of whether the 
ex-ante allocation is likely to lead to a deficit at the end of the budget period.  The decision maker may 
be able to take remedial action to revise the initial ex-ante plans to avoid a deficit.  One simple way to 
represent the essential dynamics of the allocation problem is to incorporate a two-stage formulation 
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where the realisations of costs and outcomes are revealed but the actions available to decision 
makers may be restricted. 
  
The decision maker initially makes plans to allocate resources to maximise expected health benefits 
subject to expected costs meeting the budget constraint.  For certain random realisations, the initial 
plans will result in a deficit.  When these realisations are revealed the decision maker must choose to 
curtail some of the initial treatment decisions to avoid a deficit occurring, i.e. certain treatments for 
certain groups of the population will be cancelled with the result that no treatment or a less costly and 
less effective treatment  is only available to this group.  Since the objective is to maximise health 
benefits, the decision maker will wish to cancel those activities which have the smallest impact on 
health.  This can be formulated in two-stages as follows: 
 
 
3
1
                  Max.  ( , )
                    s.t.    ( , )    1st stage
                          1  for , 1,..,3                                                    
 for
Z
Z
ijk
j
E B Z X
E C Z X
x i k
 
½°°°d < ¾°°  °¿¦
*
3
1
 Max.  ( , )
   s.t.   ( , )  
             for , 1,..,3, 2,3  (action constraint)
 all         2nd stage
         1  for , 1,..,3
                     
     
ijk ijk
ijk
j
B Z Y
C Z Y
y x i k jZ
y i k
 
½­ °° d < °°° °d   ® ¾° °° °  ° °¯ ¿¦
 *           Expected health benefits = ( , ( ))ZE B Z Y Z
            (6) 
 
The first stage is equivalent to the soft budget constraint formulation (4).  The decision maker meets 
the budget on expectation with respect to the set of random realisations Z .  The resulting output is an 
ex-ante optimal allocation vector  * * for , , 1,..,3ijkX x i j k  , which results in expected health 
benefits given by  * *( , )ZB E B Z X .  However, the random realisations Z are revealed during the 
budget period.  When a realisation occurs which means a deficit will occur, the 2
nd
 stage allows 
remedial action.  The remedial action has two main objectives: to ensure that for each random 
realisation of Z , i) the budget is strictly met, and ii) maximum benefits are achieved within the budget.  
Therefore, the 2
nd
 stage reallocates the remaining resources such that the budget is satisfied strictly 
for each random realisation Z , while maximising health benefits.  The resulting output is an optimal 
allocation vector  * *  for , , 1,..,3ijkY y i j k   for each random realisation Z . 
 
The reallocation in the second stage depends on what actions are available to the decision maker.  
Possible ways to characterise the actions which might be available include:   
 
No available actions   
 
This is equivalent to the hard budget constraint discussed above.  Since the decision maker is not 
permitted to run a deficit and no remedial actions are permitted they must set all decision variables 
ex-ante to meet the budget for every random realisation of the parameters.  This is equivalent to 
formulation (5). 
 
Complete flexibility of action 
 
The decision maker can completely revise their plans when information is revealed.  In this case there 
is no action constraint in the second stage of (6).  Since here for simplicity all realisations are revealed 
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the best allocation for each realisation can be made. This is equivalent to having perfect knowledge of 
uncertain and variable parameters ex-ante.  It represents the best that could be achieved from a hard 
budget constraint and set of treatments currently available.   
      
Restrictive actions 
 
The decision maker may only have limited opportunities to revise initial decisions. One restrictive 
action is to increase the proportion of patients in some of the population groups and programmes 
receiving the no treatment option ( 1)j  .  This can be represented by the action 
constraint  *  for , 1,..,3, 2,3ijk ijky x i k jd    in (6).  It ensures that the budget is met for every 
possible random realisation of the uncertain and variable parameters by reducing the proportion of 
patients receiving the medium ( 2)j   and highest ( 3)j  cost treatment options.  This might 
represent a situation where it is not possible to implement new services and the only available actions 
are to curtail certain plans, e.g., the cancellation of elective surgery or ward closures to stay within 
budget.  Now, the realisation of a budget deficit imposes some opportunity costs as some groups of 
patents will not receive the more effective and costly health care that was initially planned and will be 
switched from 3j  or 2j  to 1j  (no treatment).2  
 
Evaluating budgetary policies 
 
The expected total health benefit of the different budgetary policies and available actions is illustrated 
in Figure 2 for a range of budgets.  Complete flexibility of action when all realisations are revealed 
(perfect knowledge of random parameters) provides the highest expected benefit and represents the 
best that could possibly be achieved from a hard budgetary policy.
3
  Previously the hard budget 
constraint with no available actions (5) imposed significant opportunity costs.  However, once some 
restrictive actions are available expected health benefit is greater so opportunity cost is reduced.  The 
decision maker can take the risk of providing effective health care in the knowledge that remedial 
action is possible if a deficit is realised and corner solutions will be avoided even if random 
parameters are unbounded.  The maximum health benefit of 7289 is achieved at a budget of £42.7m, 
i.e., lower than £46.1m with the hard constraint in (5) but still higher than £35.8m with the soft 
constraint in (4).  With complete flexibility of action the maximum health benefit is achieved at a 
budget of £41.6m, i.e., lower than restrictive action but higher than the soft constraint.  In this 
example, all policies and actions including complete flexibility will achieve the same maximum 
expected health benefits when the budget is sufficiently large (greater than £46.1m); the ex-ante 
decisions will be the same as ex-post and no remedial actions will be necessary.
 4
  
 
                                                 
2
 There are other restrictive action constraints that are possible, e.g., that services can be substituted as well as simply cut so 
that patients can be switched from j=3 to j=2 as well as from j=3 to j=1 and from j=2 to j=1. This less restrictive constraint would 
reduce the opportunity costs of the hard budgetary policy.    
3
 A hard constraint with perfect knowledge can provide better expected health benefits than the soft budgetary policy in (4). 
However, at higher budgets, when all or most population groups are allocated to the most effective and costly care (j=3), any 
uncertainty or variability will simply mean that a deficit must be covered by the higher authority with a soft constraint (all will 
continue to receive j=3 but more will be spent on health care). However, perfect knowledge with a hard constraint will mean that 
some initially allocated to j=3 will be switched to j=2 or j=1 to stay within budget and expected health outcomes will be lower. 
Perfect knowledge with a soft constraint would provide the best possible outcomes for a given budget. This is not reported but 
the expected health benefits with a soft constraint and perfect information about uncertain parameters is presented later.  
Allowing the restrictive actions above with a soft budgetary policy will not change expected health benefit since there is no need 
to curtail plans to provide effective care as any deficit will be covered.  See footnote 4.
 
4
 In this example the effectiveness of j=3>j=2>j=1 and this ranking is not uncertain. There is uncertainty about the magnitude of 
differences in effectiveness and cost. In other circumstances, when which treatment is most effective is also uncertain then 
complete flexibility (perfect knowledge) would provide a higher maximum net health benefit. 
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Figure 3: Opportunity costs of a hard budgetary policy with restrictive actions 
 
There remains an opportunity cost of the hard budgetary policy even when restricted actions are 
possible (the difference in expected health benefit between the soft constraint and restrictive action in 
Figure 2).  These opportunity costs can be expressed as the additional budget the higher authority 
must provide to achieve the same expected health benefit as with a soft budgetary policy.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 3.  It is now possible to consider whether the higher authority should adopt a hard 
or soft budgetary policy.  A soft budgetary policy maybe worthwhile if the cost of monitoring the plans 
of health care decision makers is less than the opportunity costs of implementing a hard policy.
5
  For 
example, in Figure 3, if the cost of effectively monitoring ex-ante plans is £600,000, then a soft 
budgetary policy would be worthwhile at budgets above £15.4m.  If remedial actions where not 
available, then opportunity costs would be much greater (£2.3m and £4.8m at a budget of £15m and 
£25m, respectively) and a soft budgetary policy would be worthwhile at lower budgets or with higher 
monitoring costs.  Similarly if only some realisations are revealed, or only revealed when some 
proportion of the population has already received ex-ante treatment choices, then these opportunity 
costs will also be higher.
6
  This demonstrates that the choice of budgetary policy for a particular set of 
treatments, populations and programmes will depend on: i) the overall budget; ii) the variability in 
random parameters; iii) what realisations are revealed during the budget period; iv) what remedial 
actions are available to decision makers; and v) the costs of effectively monitoring ex-ante plans.    
  
Decision rules in CEA 
 
It has been established that standard CE decision rules are consistent with a soft budget constraint.  
All other characterisations of the constraint and available actions reported in Figure 2 lead to different 
sets of decision variables, non of which can be consistent with standard decision rules.  It is well 
established that standard decision rules are not optimal when there is more then one binding 
constraint.  Each realisation of the random parameters generates another potentially binding 
constraint when the budget is truly fixed.  Therefore standard rules based on expected cost-
effectiveness will not be optimal if any realisation becomes binding. 
 
                                                 
5
 The higher authority can be regarded as risk neutral with respect to any deficits they must indemnify as they will be able to 
spread and pool risk over the national tax base. 
 
6
 In these circumstances a greater proportion of the population will need to be switched to j=1 and from more valuable 
treatments and populations. Now corner solutions remain a possibility if realised costs are only revealed late in the budget 
period when allocating all remaining population to j=1 would still not meet the budget constraint. 
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Figure 4: Expected total health benefits for a range of notional budgets when the actual budget is £12m 
 
The formulation of the two stage problem above, however, still requires the decision maker to plan to 
meet the budget at expectation in the 1
st
 stage.  This is somewhat myopic as they may anticipate the 
need to take remedial actions when making ex-ante decisions.  Better expected outcomes maybe 
obtained when ex-ante decisions are not based on meeting the budget on expectation. This will 
depend on the reduction in health benefits and the cost savings, which result from switching from the 
higher to lower cost treatment options to stay within budget. The expected health benefit for a range 
of notional budgets when the actual hard budget constraint is set at £12m is reported in Figure 4.  
The optimal set of decision variables are initially obtained by meeting the notional budget at 
expectation in the 1
st
 stage.  In the 2
nd
 stage remedial action is taken to stay within the actual hard 
budget of £12m.  For notional budgets between £12m and £15m the total health benefit exceeds that 
obtained when planning to meet the actual budget and reaches a maximum at a notional budget of 
£13.1m.  Therefore, it is better to plan to exceed the hard budget constraint given that the initial 
decisions will be revised later if a deficit is realised.   
 
Clearly, standard decision rules based on expected cost effectiveness will not be optimal, even ex-
ante.  However, there are no other simple ex-ante rules for two reasons.  Firstly, the amount of 
notional overspend will depend on the nature of the allocation problem, the information revealed, 
possible remedial actions available as well as the actual budget. Secondly, it is also possible to find a 
set of decision variables which improve overall expected outcomes (2
nd
 stage) which do not maximise 
ex-ante expected health benefit (1
st
 stage).
7
   Therefore, truly optimal ex-ante decisions are unlikely to 
be consistent with either meeting the budget at expectation or maximising ex-ante expected health 
benefits.  Through this simple but more general formulation of the allocation problem, we have 
demonstrated that standard decision rules are only optimal in very special circumstances and that 
there are no simple rules which lead to optimal ex-ante decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 For each random realisation of the parameters, there exists an optimal allocation vector X~ .  These allocation 
vectors, NXX
~
,...,
~
1 , provide a sample of all the candidate ex-ante allocations which could be chosen.   Implementing each in 
turn enables a search for those sets of decision variables which improve overall expected benefits.  In this case, of 4900 
sampled allocations, 470 improved expected health outcome after the 2
nd
 stage.  All predicted expected costs at the 1
st
 stage 
were higher than the budget of £12m, confirming that a notional overspend maybe optimal.  In addition, the allocation which 
maximised overall health did not provide the highest ex-ante health benefit, demonstrating that it may be better not to maximise 
ex-ante expected health outcome even with a notional overspend.    
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The Research Decision 
 
Allocation decisions based on expected cost-effectiveness will be appropriate only if the budget 
constraint is regarded as soft as described above.  Even in these uncommon circumstances allocation 
decisions may not simply be based on little - or poor quality - evidence, since the question of whether 
further research to support allocation between treatments, populations and programmes should be 
made simultaneously.  Therefore there are two conceptually distinct but simultaneous questions that 
must be addressed within any heath care system.  Firstly, which technologies should be adopted 
given the existing evidence and secondly, is additional evidence required to support this allocation 
decision.  To address the second question a means to establish the value of additional evidence or 
equivalently the expected costs of uncertainty is required. 
 
Expected value of information 
 
Bayesian decision theory and expected value of information (EVI) analysis provides such an analytic 
framework (Pratt et al., 1995, Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1959).   These methods are used increasingly in 
operations research, decision analysis, risk analysis and health economics (Artstein, 1999, 
Azondekon and Martel, 1999).  To date all EVI analysis within health care has been based on the 
standard decision rules used in CEA and therefore addresses the value of information associated with 
the choice between mutually exclusive treatments for a population group within a particular 
programme (Ades et al., 2004, Claxton, 1999, Claxton and Sculpher, 2006).  For example, if there 
are j alternative mutually exclusive treatments in programme k for population i , with uncertain 
parameters T , the optimal decision with current information would be to choose the treatment that 
generates the maximum expected net health or monetary benefit (NB), i.e.,  max NB( , )j E jT T .  If 
these uncertainties could be resolved (with perfect information) the decision-maker could select the 
treatment that maximises the net benefit for a particular value of T .  However, the true values of T  
are unknown, so the expected value of a decision taken with perfect information is found by averaging 
these maximum net benefits over the joint distribution of T , i.e.,  max NB( , )jE jT T .   The 
expected value of perfect information ( EVPIik ) for an individual within the relevant population is 
simply the difference between the expected value of the decision made with perfect information about 
the uncertain parameters T , and the decision made on the basis of existing evidence: 
    EVPI max NB( , ) max ( , )ik j jE j E NB jT TT T                                                          (7) 
 
The expected value of perfect information (EVPI) is also the expected opportunity loss and represents 
an upper bound on the value of evidence that may be generated by conducting research.  When 
expressed in monetary terms for the relevant population, it provides a necessary condition for the 
research decision (if the costs of the proposed research exceed the EVPI then the research will not 
be worthwhile).  Since the decisions within populations and across programmes are independent 
(assuming no exchangeability of evidence), the value of information for the whole allocation problem 
is simply the sum of EVPIs across all these independent decisions:   
 
3 3
1 1
EVPI EVPIik ik
k i
n
  
 u¦¦                (8) 
where ikn is the size of population i within programme k . 
 
This approach to informing the research decision suffers from a number of limitations, even if a soft 
budgetary policy was in place.  With a single budget for health care, from which services need to be 
provided and research conducted, it is not clear where opportunity costs of the resources needed for 
research actually fall.  The use of a CE threshold, even if correctly assessed, will only be appropriate 
for marginal changes relative to the budget.  In essence it assumes that health can continue to be 
bought at a constant rate.  The budget is in fact unlimited at that rate or equivalently unlimited 
resources for research are available from some other source as long as the research generates 
health at the rate given by the threshold.  This means that in practice the EVPI and therefore the 
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amount that might be spent on research can be very large and constitute a very large proportion of 
the total budget.  The actual opportunity cost will be substantially higher than that implied by the 
threshold.  The real policy question is, how much of the budget would the decision maker be willing to 
give up to resolve the uncertainties in the allocation problem?  This can only be established by solving 
the allocation and research decision problem simultaneously even if a soft budgetary policy was in 
place. 
 
More problems with the standard approach to EVI arise with a hard budgetary policy: i) the expected 
opportunity costs of uncertainty will tend to increase as it leads to either restrictive ex-ante allocations 
or costly remedial actions; ii) the EVI will therefore depend partly on the realisations that are revealed 
and the actions available as well as the budgetary policy; iii) the value of resolving the uncertainty 
associated with parameters will no longer be independent of the variability in these and other random 
parameters because this will partly determine when realised constraints bind with and without 
additional information.  Resolving uncertainty in one programme may mean that unrelated treatments 
can be adopted in other independent programmes and/or costly remedial actions elsewhere be 
avoided, i.e., the value of information within one programme is no longer independent of other 
independent programmes, populations and treatments. To resolve these problems a more general 
and unified approach to the allocation and research decision problem is required.  
 
General approach to EVI  
 
The expected health benefits based on existing evidence under a hard budgetary policy but with 
some restrictive actions available is provided in (6).  Establishing the value of information for this 
allocation problem requires the sources of variation in the random parameters Z to be distinguished.  
The value of these parameters may be variable ( )' and the estimates of their expected values 
uncertain ( )T . The set of random parameters can therefore be expressed as the union of these two 
sets  Z T ' .  Information will reduce the randomness due to uncertainty but will not affect the 
variability in their values.   
 
With this in mind a similar formulation is able to characterise expected health benefits with perfect 
information where the uncertain parameters are resolved ex-ante,  
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                Expected health benefits = ( , , ( ))E E B YT T T' ' '
                         (9) 
 
With perfect information, the expectation in the 1
st
 stage is conditional on a particular resolutionT of 
the uncertain parameters, but is carried out over the variability in their values' .  A 2nd stage is still 
required because even for a particular value ofT  some realisations of the variability could result in a 
deficit.  Therefore, the 2
nd
 stage allows remedial actions for every random realisation of the values of 
the parameters conditional on a particular value ofT .  However, the true values of T are unknown, so 
the expected health benefit of an allocation decision taken with perfect information is found by taking 
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expectation over the joint distribution of T .  The EVPI for the allocation problem as a whole is the 
difference in expected health benefit with perfect (9) and current (6) information: 
     ** *| ,EVPI ( , , ( )) ( , , ( , ))E E B Y E B YT T TT T T' ' ' '  ' '                                          (10) 
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Figure 5: EVPI in expected health benefit for a hard budgetary policy with restrictive actions 
 
The EVPI expressed in expected health gains over a range of budgets is illustrated in Figure 5.  When 
the budget is very low very little health care can be provided so there is little opportunity to improve 
health even when uncertainties are resolved.  Equally, when the budget is very large (greater than 
£35.8m), all the most effective and costly treatment options are able to be implemented in full across 
all population groups and programmes. Additional information will not produce any gains in health 
outcome because in this example it is the magnitude of differences in effect and cost between the 
treatments rather than their ranking which is uncertain.
4 
 The changes in the slope of the EVPI curve 
illustrated in Figure 5 represent points where the optimal treatments selected switch (decision 
variables take integer values), i.e., at similar points as the steps in Figure 1.  Between these points 
the same set of treatments are selected but in different proportions within a particular population, i.e. 
a mixed programme.   
 
Table 1: EVPI in monetary terms 
Budget Current information Perfect information EVPI (health gains) 
£10,904,000 4641 4863  
£12,000,000 4863 5067 204 
 
The monetary value of information is how much of the budget the decision maker should be willing to 
give up to resolve the uncertainties in the allocation problem.  This is the reduction in budget required 
with perfect information that will generate the same expected benefits as with current information.  It 
represents the maximum amount of budget that the health care system should be willing to give up for 
additional evidence and places an upper bound on research expenditure.  The conversion of EVPI in 
health gains to monetary terms is demonstrated in Table 1 for a budget of £12m.  Decreasing the 
budget of £12m to £10.904m with perfect information (i.e. a decrease of £1.096m) gives the same 
expected benefits as a budget of £12m with current information.  Therefore, the EVPI of 204 units of 
health gain equates to an EVPI of £1.096m.  
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Figure 6: EVPI in monetary terms for a hard budgetary policy with no available actions versus restrictive 
actions  
 
The EVPI in monetary terms over a range of budgets is illustrated in Figure 6 for a budgetary policy 
with restrictive actions.  The same characteristics are evident.  EVPI will be low at very low budgets 
and also low at very high budgets when all the most effective care can be provided.
4
   Also the 
changes in the slope of the EVPI curve in Figure 6 are consistent with those in Figure 5.  However, 
the implicit monetary value of the health gains offered by additional information increases with the 
budget.  At a budget of £7m, the EVPI in health gains is only just lower than at budget of £25m but the 
EVPI in monetary terms  is substantially lower.  Although there is no unique shadow price or threshold 
(each realisation of random parameters generates a new potentially binding constraint with its own 
shadow price) and any shadow price or threshold will only be relevant for marginal changes, the 
relationship between budget and the implied value of health still exists.  However, it can only be 
inferred from the solutions to the allocation problem and will be specific to the non-marginal change 
as well as the budgetary policy, what realisations are revealed and the remedial actions available. 
 
The EVPI will also depend on the budgetary policy and the available actions.   For example, the EVPI 
with a hard budgetary policy with no available actions is the difference between the expected health 
benefits with perfect information in (11) below and current information in (5). 
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This EVPI expressed in monetary terms is also illustrated in Figure 6.  The EVPI with no actions 
available is substantially higher at all budgets and remains positive until a higher total budget.  This 
should be expected, as any realisation of parameters that implies a deficit will impose greater 
opportunity costs because no remedial actions are available and additional budget is required before 
decision makers are able to take the risk of providing the most effective care.  Therefore, the value of 
resolving uncertainty will tend to be higher when actions are more restrictive or not all realisations are 
revealed or revealed later.  This also demonstrates that the EVPI depends, in part on the variability in 
the values that parameters can take.  For example, without variability the expected health benefits 
with perfect information would be the same in (9) as (11) and the expected health benefits with 
current information in (6) and (5) would change. 
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Figure 7: EVPI in monetary terms for a soft budgetary policy compared to standard EVPI 
 
The EVPI under a soft budgetary policy can also be established in a similar way.  The expected 
health benefit with current information is provided in (4).  With perfect information decision variables 
can be chosen conditional on a particular value of T  which meets the budget at expectation over' .  
The expected health benefit with perfect information is the expectation over these conditional choices.  
The monetary EVPI for a soft budgetary policy is illustrated in Figure 7 for a range of budgets.  The 
same characteristics are evident.  EVPI will be low at very low budgets and also low at very high 
budgets when all the most effective care can be provided.
4
  The changes in the slope of the EVPI 
Budgetary policies and available actions: a generalisation of decision rules for allocation and research decisions   17 
 
 
curve are consistent with those in Figures 5 and 6.  The EVPI is, as expected, lower than with a hard 
budgetary policy with either no actions or restricted actions available.
8
  
 
The standard approach to EVPI described in (7) and (8) is also illustrated in Figure 7 for a range of 
budgets, using the correct thresholds reported in Figure 1.  For budgets less than £25m it does 
appear similar to the EVPI for a soft budgetary policy, confirming the pervious discussion that the 
standard approach to EVPI is based on the standard decision rules in CEA which in turn are only 
consistent with a soft constraint.   However, as discussed above, there are good reasons why the 
standard approach will not be entirely consistent even with a soft budgetary policy.  For example, 
standard EVPI is substantially higher at budgets greater than £25m.  The reason is that when the 
budget is sufficiently high, all the most costly and effective care ( 3)j  is received.  In the standard 
approach the cost effectiveness of this care remains uncertain and for some realisations it may not be 
regarded as cost-effective when compared to a fixed threshold.  In essence this assumes that any 
costs saved by rejecting 3j  can buy more health elsewhere at this fixed rate.  Of course the reality 
is very different: health cannot continue to be bought at a fixed rate.  Once all population groups are 
allocated to 3j  ex-ante, there is no gain from switching them to less effective care irrespective of 
realised values.
4
    
 
The research decision problem is, how much of the budget should a decision maker be willing to give 
up to resolve the uncertainties in the allocation problem?  This can only be established by solving the 
allocation and research decision problem simultaneously using a more general and unified approach 
than is offered by the current approaches to EVI.  Indeed, the standard approach to EVPI is a 
peculiarly special case.  A more general formulation demonstrates that the value of information and 
need for evidence depends on: i) the budgetary policy in place; ii) the realisations revealed during the 
budget period; iii) remedial actions that may be available; and iv) variability in parameters values.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
It is possible to characterise the allocation and research decision problem when costs and effects are 
both uncertain and variable without relying on exogenous and arbitrary parameters.  In doing so it is 
possible to formulate a more general and unified approach which can simultaneously address 
allocation and research decisions.  This more general approach demonstrates that standard decision 
rules in CEA are a very special case which requires budget constraints to be soft in addition to 
assumptions of perfect divisibility, constant returns and all costs and benefits occurring within the 
budgetary period.  If the budget constraint cannot be violated then the optimal allocation will depend 
on the realisations that are revealed to the decision maker and what remedial actions will be 
available.  In these circumstances truly optimal ex-ante decisions are unlikely to be consistent with 
either meeting the budget at expectation or maximising ex-ante expected health benefits. Through 
this simple but more general formulation of the allocation problem, we have demonstrated that 
standard decision rules are only optimal in very special circumstances and that there are no simple 
rules which lead to optimal ex-ante decisions.  It also becomes possible to evaluate alternative 
budgetary policies that may be imposed by a higher authority.  The choice of budgetary policy for a 
particular set of treatments, populations and programmes will depend on: i) the overall budget; ii) the 
variability in random parameters; iii) what realisations are revealed during the budget period; iv) what 
remedial actions are available to decision makers; and v) the costs of effectively monitoring ex-ante 
plans. 
 
By distinguishing uncertainty and variability as the source of randomness in costs and outcomes it is 
possible to address the research decision problem simultaneously and consistently.  The research 
decision problem is how much of the budget a decision maker should be willing to give up to resolve 
uncertainties in the allocation problem? This represents the maximum the health care system should 
be willing to give up for additional evidence and places and upper bound on research expenditure.  
                                                 
8
 It should be noted that all realisations are revealed in the formulation of the hard constraint in (6) but not in the soft constraint in (4).  
However, in this case, even if the same realisations where revealed under a soft constraint non of the restrictive actions would be taken 
because the only possibility is to switch patients to no treatment which is known to be less effective.  In other circumstances where either 
more actions are possible or the ranking of the effectiveness of treatments is also uncertain then explicitly modelling the realisations 
revealed and the available actions would be necessary under both a soft and hard budgetary. Also see footnotes 3 and 4. 
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This EVPI for the whole allocation problem will depend on the budgetary policy in place, the 
realisations revealed and remedial actions available as well as the variability in parameter values.  
The standard approach to EVPI is a peculiarly special case which requires both a soft constraint and 
the assumption that health can continue to be purchased at a constant rate.  It should be apparent 
that resolving uncertainty in one programme may mean that unrelated treatments can be adopted in 
other independent programmes and/or costly remedial actions elsewhere be avoided, i.e., the value of 
information within one programme is no longer independent of other independent programmes, 
populations and treatments.   
 
Whilst preserving the essential dynamics and key features of the allocation problem a number of 
simplifications have been made in developing this formulation and applying it to a simple numerical 
example.  A number of extensions could be considered. These include considering which realisations 
will be revealed and at what point during the budgetary period.  Currently the two stage formulation 
allows all realisations to be revealed to the decision maker, but restricts the actions that can be taken.  
However, the realisations of costs falling on the budget may be more likely to be revealed than health 
outcomes. Also they will tend to be revealed over time during the budgetary period as populations are 
treated, initially based on ex-ante plans.  Even if the decision maker has unrestricted actions available 
some proportion of the population will have received ex-ante treatment choices and these costs can 
not be recovered.  Any remedial action is only possible for that proportion of the population not yet 
treated but such decisions must be taken before the remaining costs and effects are revealed.  
Therefore rather than a two stage formulation a multi stage or dynamic programming formulation 
would be necessary.  This would provide a means to consider the value of investing in information 
systems which allow realisations to be revealed earlier, avoiding more costly remedial actions later in 
the budgetary period. Finally, decision makers face more than one budgetary period and face 
decisions which impact on costs and benefits falling in different periods. Multiple budgetary periods 
would allow exploration of budgetary rules where decision makers may run deficits in one period if 
covered by subsequent surpluses and where a current surplus can be carried forward to the next 
period.  This would also allow evaluation of policies where decision makers could borrow against 
future budgets at some market rate of return and explore the implications of uncertainty in future 
budgets.  However, although extending this analysis in a variety of way would be of value the key 
insights provided by this simplified formulation would remain. 
 
The analysis has demonstrated that there are no simple ex-ante decision rules in most common 
circumstances and the value of information cannot be established for one programme independently 
of the rest of the allocation problem.  Optimal allocation and research decisions would require full 
knowledge of the expected costs and effects of all the available treatments for every population 
across all health care programmes.  In addition it would require knowledge of variability in these 
values, the uncertainty in their expected values and an understanding of when realisations may be 
revealed.  In a similar way to the problem of second best, these informational requirements means 
that it is not feasible to identify truly optimal allocation and research decisions for current policy 
purposes. Nevertheless it is valuable to understand the circumstances in which standard decision 
rules and analysis may be expected to be a poor guide to optimal ex-ante allocation and research 
decision, i.e., a useful question is how sub optimal are allocation and research decisions likely to be if 
based on standard analysis.  This is similar to the more familiar question, are first best rules in a 
second best world reasonable in a situation of information poverty.   
 
With a soft constraint the standard decision rules will be optimal if the common assumptions of 
divisibility and constant returns also hold.  However, if the constraint is hard then technologies will 
need to be more cost-effective (an ICER substantially below the threshold) before the decision maker 
should take the risk of an ex-ante decision to adopt them.  Greater cost-effectiveness would need to 
be observed ex-ante when little is revealed during the budgetary period, only revealed later when 
resources are already committed or if the remedial actions are more restricted.  If this is extended to 
multiple budgetary periods how much more cost-effective a technology will need to be will also 
depend on the cost of covering deficits from future budgets (both the rate of interest and opportunities 
forgone in the future period)  and the possibility and returns of carrying surpluses forward to future 
periods.  Similarly some general concussions can be drawn for the research decision.  For example, 
with a hard constraint current estimates of value of information will tend to underestimate the 
opportunity cost of uncertainty and neglect the impact that resolving uncertainty would have on other 
unrelated programmes.  On the other hand if the constraint is indeed soft, the standard approach may 
tend to overestimate value by assuming that health can be purchased at a constant rate.  Therefore, 
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estimates of value of information that are very high (relative to the total budget) should be interpreted 
with caution. They may indicate the relative importance of evidence but not necessarily indicate that a 
substantial proportion of the total budget should be devoted to such research.   The more general 
formulation presented above shows that standard decision rules and measures of value are 
necessarily proxies for an uncertain and complex process.  The use of such proxies for practical 
policy purposes is both inevitable and commonplace in all areas of public (and private) choice.  
Understanding the key characteristics of the process they proxy and the circumstance in which they 
are expected to perform particularly badly seems valuable and responsible.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1: Data used for 3 hypothetical treatment alternatives ( 1,..,3)j  in 3 separate population groups ( 1,..,3)i   within 3 independent health care 
programmes ( 1,..,3)k  . 
Programme Population Treatment Population size Expected Utility Expected Cost Incremental CE ratio
k i j N Utility Cost (£) Probability
†
Utility Cost (£) Probability
‡
EU EC ICER (£)
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.7 0 0.00 0.1 0
1 2 1000 0.3 450 0.50 0.7 300 0.50 0.5 375 937.50
3 0.6 6600 0.15 0.95 1100 0.85 0.8975 1925 3899.37
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.7 0 0.00 0.1 0
1 2 2 1000 0.3 975 0.50 0.7 650 0.50 0.5 812.5 2031.25
3 0.6 12000 0.15 0.95 2000 0.85 0.8975 3500 6761.01
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.7 0 0.00 0.1 0
3 2 1000 0.3 1950 0.50 0.7 1300 0.50 0.5 1625 4062.50
3 0.6 21000 0.15 0.95 3500 0.85 0.8975 6125 11320.75
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.6 0 0.00 0.1 0
1 2 1000 0.3 450 0.50 0.6 300 0.50 0.45 375 1071.43
3 0.6 6600 0.15 0.85 1100 0.85 0.8125 1925 4275.86
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.6 0 0.00 0.1 0
2 2 2 1000 0.3 975 0.50 0.6 650 0.50 0.45 812.5 2321.43
3 0.6 12000 0.15 0.85 2000 0.85 0.8125 3500 7413.79
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.6 0 0.00 0.1 0
3 2 1000 0.3 1950 0.50 0.6 1300 0.50 0.45 1625 4642.86
3 0.6 21000 0.15 0.85 3500 0.85 0.8125 6125 12413.79
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.5 0 0.00 0.1 0
1 2 1000 0.3 450 0.50 0.5 300 0.50 0.4 375 1250.00
3 0.6 6600 0.15 0.75 1100 0.85 0.7275 1925 4732.82
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.5 0 0.00 0.1 0
3 2 2 1000 0.3 975 0.50 0.5 650 0.50 0.4 812.5 2708.33
3 0.6 12000 0.15 0.75 2000 0.85 0.7275 3500 8206.11
1 0.1 0 1.00 0.5 0 0.00 0.1 0
3 2 1000 0.3 1950 0.50 0.5 1300 0.50 0.4 1625 5416.67
3 0.6 21000 0.15 0.75 3500 0.85 0.7275 6125 13740.46
Outcome: a Outcome: b
 

Probability of outcome b given treatments j=2 and j=3 assumed to follow a beta distribution.  The parameters of the beta distribution were obtained by the method of moments.  
A beta(12,12) and beta(9.99,1.76) was fitted to treatments j=2 and j=3, respectively, in each population group.  

Probability of outcome a is 1minus probability of outcome b. 
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